Over the past 81 years, Vietnam has faced several choices that could change the country's course. In your view, which were the most consequential? And today, with institutional reform, streamlining of the state apparatus, and the "four resolutions" - the Politburo's Resolutions 57, 59, 66 and 68 - are we facing another such historic choice?

Looking back from 1945, after the August Revolution and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, to the present, the country has made several decisive strategic choices.

The first was the decision to rise up to defend the country's hard-won independence, beginning with the nationwide resistance war on December 19, 1946. The wars against French colonialists and then American imperialists lasted 30 years and involved immense hardship and sacrifice. They ultimately resulted in victory in the struggle to defend independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to reunify the country.

The second choice was Doi moi (reform) in 1986. Ten years after peace was restored, the Vietnamese economy gradually fell into crisis as a result of the devastating consequences of wars, international embargoes and isolation, as well as an unsuitable economic system.

The sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam decided to renew economic thinking and reform the economic institutions, moving toward a socialist-oriented market economy. Doi moi unleashed productive forces, helped the economy emerge from crisis, and opened a new phase of development.

The third choice was to proactively pursue deeper integration into the world. The normalization of relations with the U.S., Vietnam's accession to ASEAN in 1995 and its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2007 were important milestones. Vietnam chose to open up, befriend all countries and engage more deeply in the global economy, thereby creating additional resources and development space while enhancing the country's position.

Today, we are facing another extremely important choice. The streamlining of the state apparatus, restructuring of government organizations, and Resolutions 57, 59, 66 and 68, along with other resolutions issued afterward, show that we are undertaking major changes in our thinking, institutions and the way the entire system operates to create new drivers of development for the country. This reflects a clearer understanding and vision of the world today, where we stand, and the directions, opportunities and challenges for the country's future development.

Therefore, this is a fateful choice, but its outcome will be determined by our ability to implement the very essential decisions in the years ahead.

You have said that the first Doi moi was about "loosening constraints," while the second should be about "enabling." As someone who experienced the 1986 reform, how do you see the spirit of this renewal process differing from that of 1986?

The most fundamental difference is that the 1986 reform began by removing constraints to unleash the people's productive potential, while this round of reform must focus on enabling development to foster people's creativity.

In 1986, we dismantled the constraints of the centrally planned economy and restored people's freedom to do business and develop the economy. At the time, Doi moi brought about three major transformations: shifting from a centrally planned system to a socialist-oriented market economy; developing a multi-sector economy in which the private sector was recognized; and opening up to the world.

Today, however, the context is very different. The world is increasingly driven by technology, innovation and knowledge, while global markets are becoming more complex and competition is intensifying under much higher standards. We can no longer rely primarily on cheap labor and natural resources as we did in the past. Therefore, this round of reform must focus on enabling development, starting with an enabling government.

The government should not do the work of businesses or citizens, but should create a conducive environment or ecosystem for them to develop on their own, with coordinated support spanning institutions, infrastructure, human resources, science and technology. When citizens and businesses have legitimate needs, it should proactively seek ways to meet them, rather than simply doing what it already has the capacity to do or what is most convenient for itself.

In particular, in digital transformation, green transition, and strategic choices and development priorities, we need to allocate resources more effectively, focusing on areas capable of generating higher productivity, better-quality growth and greater sustainability.

Finally, we need to raise the capabilities of the Vietnamese people. We cannot continue to rely on the advantage of cheap labor. We need a workforce with strong skills, the ability to learn continuously, innovate and adapt to new development requirements.

That is the deeper meaning of "enabling": not simply creating more space for people to do business, but creating the conditions for every Vietnamese person to strengthen and fully realize their capabilities.

Resolution 66 calls for comprehensive reform of lawmaking and law enforcement, while Resolution 68 introduces new mechanisms for the private sector, such as sandboxes and incentives for R&D investment. In your view, what is the most significant new element in this approach to institutional reform? Have we begun to accept experimentation, including the risks and failures that come with it?

This is a very new and noteworthy development. Resolution 66 responds to the requirements of both Resolution 57 on science and technology and innovation, and Resolution 68 on private sector development.

Innovation requires investment in research and development (R&D). Allowing up to 200% of R&D costs to be included as deductible expenses for taxes is a significant step forward, reflecting a change in the way investment in research and development is viewed.

The sandbox mechanism is also something we have been discussing for many years. Since around 2016, when discussions on the Fourth Industrial Revolution began, Vietnam had talked about this mechanism for new technologies and business models, but implementation was very slow. Resolution 66 now sets clearer requirements and begins to put them into practice step by step.

Importantly, Resolutions 57 and 68 converge on one point: placing businesses, particularly private companies, at the center of innovation.

When researching and experimenting with something new, risks and the possibility of failure are inevitable. We cannot expect a new research project or technology to succeed immediately from the moment it is launched. Allowing experimentation and accepting failure within a transparent and controlled framework represents a major shift in policy thinking.

If we are so afraid of failure and accountability that we dare not try anything new, innovation will not be possible. The state must create an environment in which people have the right to experiment, make mistakes and have the opportunity to try again, provided they comply with clearly defined limits and principles.

The World Bank Group has warned that Vietnam needs to maintain the momentum of institutional reform if it wants to achieve its goal of becoming a high-income country by 2045. In your view, what is the biggest risk that could cause reforms to stall after the restructuring and consolidation of the state apparatus are completed?

What concerns me most is the gap between policy and implementation.

We have introduced a fairly comprehensive, relatively coordinated and consistent system of new institutions and policies. There has never been a time when so many new legal documents and regulations have been issued across so many areas and at such a rapid pace as now. Most of them are positive and reflect a spirit of strong reform.

However, there also needs to be a better consultation process to ensure the quality of these documents and to make it easier for businesses and citizens to anticipate changes, rather than having to "cross the river by feeling the stones" or stop and wait.

But the weakest point has long been implementation. No matter how good the policies are, if the state apparatus lacks the capacity to implement them, it will be difficult to bring about substantive change.

I am not concerned that the merger of provinces and communes will cause reforms to stall. Consolidation is the right policy. What matters is whether the apparatus after the mergers will actually change its thinking and the way it operates.

The new apparatus must operate in the spirit of an enabling state, meaning it should facilitate the activities of citizens and businesses rather than simply carry out administrative procedures in the old way.

In the past, there were still cases in which procedures dragged on, documents were passed from one place to another, and it was unclear who ultimately bore responsibility. Therefore, this round of reform must go hand in hand with transparency and accountability. Decentralization must come with accountability; responsibilities cannot simply be devolved and then become unclear when problems arise.

If the new apparatus continues to operate with old thinking, focusing heavily on procedures and avoiding responsibility, then no matter how many levels or units are reorganized, the reforms will struggle to produce substantive change.

For many years, you have argued that the private economic sector should be regarded as a driving force of the economy rather than merely a supporting sector. Resolution 68 now identifies it as one of the most important drivers of the economy. In your view, what needs to change for this policy to be translated into reality?

This is an entirely appropriate choice. Vietnam’s private sector has matured enough and developed sufficient strength to play a leading role in driving the economy. However, much remains to be done to turn this choice into substantive reality, particularly given the country’s new development requirements.

Many Vietnamese private companies have demonstrated a strong entrepreneurial spirit and a willingness to think big, act bold, and take risks to compete and reach global markets.

Vietnam now has billion-US-dollar groups such as Vingroup, Thaco, Hoa Phat, Vietjet, Sun Group and BRG, which have undertaken and continue to pursue major projects. Alongside them are companies that have built strong positions across a range of sectors, including Vinamilk, REE, Deo Ca, FPT, CMC, VNG and Trung Nguyen.

Of the 500 largest companies in Vietnam listed in the VNR500 rankings, more than 300 were private companies by 2025.

Small and medium-sized enterprises account for around 98% of all businesses in Vietnam, while more than 6 million household businesses also make significant contributions to the economy, particularly by creating jobs and incomes for more than 80% of the country’s workforce. Their role in socio-economic development, poverty reduction and helping Vietnam reach the upper-middle-income threshold in terms of gross national income (GNI), as recently reported by the World Bank, is by no means insignificant.

However, the private sector still faces many limitations, particularly in labor productivity, the quality and efficiency of production and business operations, and competitiveness. These shortcomings are especially evident when Vietnamese private companies are compared with foreign-invested enterprises operating in Vietnam and with those in comparable economies in the region and globally. In general, Vietnamese private firms remain too slow to scale up.

Private companies of all sizes in Vietnam understand that what they have achieved so far will not guarantee success in the future. The domestic environment has changed, while the world is changing at an extraordinary pace. Many industries are undergoing rapid transformations in technology, markets, business organization and the resources required to compete and grow.

If companies do not move quickly to undertake fundamental changes and innovate, opportunities to move ahead will pass them by. Even survival could become increasingly difficult.

But the bigger policy question is how to ensure that Vietnam’s private sector becomes larger and stronger, and is capable of playing its role as the economy’s most important driver in this new phase of development, when the country faces increasingly demanding requirements. How can a broad base of Vietnamese private companies become more competitive and resilient in the face of constant shifts in global markets? And how can more companies develop the capabilities needed to expand internationally and take the lead in selected areas of technology and global supply chains?

To achieve this, the government must fully deliver on its role as an enabler. It must create a genuinely level playing field, reduce compliance costs and the cost of public services, ensure that private companies have access to the resources they need, and encourage investment in technology, R&D, and innovation. Only then can the private sector’s spirit of “daring to think and daring to act” be translated into the genuine competitiveness of the economy.